Stabsseminar på fredag

Institutt for foretaksøkonomi har stabsseminar på fredag. Seminaret er ved Orly Sade, Hebrew University, temaet er Competition and Cooperation in Divisible Good Auctions: An Experimental Examination.

31.03.2004 - Stig Nøra

Tid: Fredag 2.april klokken 12.15-13.30

Sted: Auditorium B (NB! Merk sted!)

Abstract

An experimental approach is used to examine the performance of three
different multi-unit auction designs: discriminatory, uniform-price with
fixed supply, and uniformprice with endogenous supply. We find that the
strategies of the individual bidders and the aggregate demand curves are
inconsistent with theoretically identified equilibrium strategies. The
discriminatory auction is found to be more susceptible to collusion than
are the uniform-price auctions, and so contrary to theoretical
predictions and previous experimental results, the discriminatory
auction provides the lowest average revenue. Consistent with theoretical
predictions, bidder demands are more elastic with reducible supply or
discriminatory pricing than in the uniform-price auction with fixed
supply. Despite a lack of a priori differences across bidders, the
discriminatory auction results in significantly more symmetric
allocations.

Paper er tilgjengelig på http://www.nhh.no/for/seminars/2004-spring/020404.pdf

Jarle Møen (59612)