Stabsseminar på fredag

Institutt for foretaksøkonomi har stabsseminar på fredag. Seminaret er ved Jose Penalva, Universtat Pompeu Fabra. Temaet er "Optimal Information Transmission in Private Value Auctions"

13.05.2004 - Stig Nøra

Tid: Fredag 14.mai klokken 12.15-13.30
Sted: Auditorium 14

Abstract

We study a situation in which a seller wishes to sell an object to one
of N risk-neutral bidders. Before the auction takes place, the seller
can provide information to bidders. Formally, bidders receive private
random signals related to their valuations. The seller controls the
accuracy of bidders' private signals, but he cannot observe their
realizations. We characterize the auctioneer's optimal information
release and the optimal mechanism in this setting. We show that the
optimal selling strategy is to allow to bidders to learn their
valuations with lower precision than would be efficient. We also show
that in standard auctions the amount of information released by the
auctioneer increases with the level of competition in the market (as
measured by the number of bidders) and reaches the efficient level with
perfect competition. Further, we prove that if we allow the auctioneer
to introduce a reserve price, that reserve price will not be independent
of the number of bidders: as the number of bidders increases the reserve
price will become increasingly restrictive.

Paper er tilgjengelig på http://www.nhh.no/for/seminars/2004-spring/140504.pdf

Svein-Arne Persson (59547)
Jarle Møen (59612)