Stabsseminar tirsdag

Tirsdag 24. februar holder Institutt for foretaksøkonomi stabsseminar. Seminaret er ved Nina Baranchuk, Washington University, St. Louis og temaet er An Empirical Analysis of Option Grants to CEOs. Seminaret er det femte av en rekke jobbseminarer ved instituttet.

23.02.2004 - Frode Martin Nordvik

Tid: Tirsdag 24.februar klokken 10.00-11.30

Sted: Auditorium 13

Abstract:

"This paper revisits the question of whether CEO compensation practices are in keeping with those justified by agency theory. On a basis of a new hierarchical panel Tobit model that allows for more complex forms of heterogeneity in covariate elects across firms, estimated by modern Bayesian methods on a new data set, we find (contrary to the existing empirical results) that companies increase option awards to their CEOs when agency problems become more pronounced. We also find that liquidity constraints matter in defining the cash-option mix in the CEO
compensation. In addition, even after controlling for firm and CEO characteristics, the estimates for time dummy coeffcients imply a
significant increase in popularity of option grants during the last decade."