Stabsseminar ved institutt for samfunnsøkonomi

Institutt for samfunnsøkonomi holder stabsseminar ved Susan Rose-Ackerman, mandag 23. september.

20.09.2002 - Per Arne Solend

Ved:
Susan Rose-Ackerman, Department of Political Science, Yale University
http://www.yale.edu/polisci/Faculty/SRose-ackerman.htm.

Tema: Electoral rules as constraints on corruption
Tid: Mandag 23. september kl. 1415-1530
Sted: Karl Borchs auditorium

Paper kan hentes på Miljørommet til Institutt for samfunnsøkonomi i 4. etasje.

Abstract:
This paper investigates how electoral rules influence political corruption. We show that proportional representation (PR) systems are more susceptible to corruption then plurality systems. We argue that this result depends on the different loci of rents in PR and plurality systems, and on the monitoring difficulties faced by both voters and opposition parties under PR. We also examine the interaction between electoral rules and presidentialism. We test our main predictions, interaction effects, and the proposed causal mechanism on a cross-section of up to 94 democracies. The empirical findings strongly support our hypothesis that PR systems, especially together with presidentialism, are associated with higher levels of corruption.