Stabsseminar på fredag

Institutt for foretaksøkonomi holder stabsseminar på fredag. Seminaret er ved Eugene Kandel, Hebrew University Jerusalem. Temaet er A Rational Expectations Theory of the Kink in Earnings Reports.

09.09.2004 - Stig Nøra

Tid: Fredag 10.september klokken 12.15-13.30
Sted: Karl Borchs auditorium

Abstract
Empirical evidence suggests that the distribution of earnings reports exhibits kinks. Managers manage earnings as if to meet exogenously pre-specified targets, such as avoiding losses and avoiding a decrease in earnings. This is puzzling because the compensation to managers at these pre-specified targets seems to be smooth. We propose a game theoretic model explaining this phenomenon. In our model, investors form expectations of such a manipulative behavior by the manager. Given these expectations, the best response of the manager is to fulfill the investors' expectations, resulting in a discontinuity in the distribution of earnings reports. Our model generates several new empirical predictions regarding the existence of the kink, its size and its location relative to the distribution of earnings reports.

Paper er tilgjengelig på http://www.nhh.no/for/seminars/2004-fall/100904.pdf

Jarle Møen (59612)